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The Probationer, the Free Man,
and the Fourth Amendment:
Constitutional Protections for
Those Who Have Served Their
Sentences and Those Who Have
Not*
by Rachel Ness-Maddox
I. INTRODUCTION
In Park v. State,1 the Georgia Supreme Court evaluated whether
persons convicted of sexual offenses and subsequently classified as
"sexually dangerous predator[s]" may be required to wear Global
Positioning System (GPS) tracking devices after serving their full
sentences, including fulfilling probation or parole requirements. 2 The
court held that, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution,3 such a requirement is invalid because it infringes on the
right free people have against unreasonable searches and seizures
executed by the state—no matter the crimes for which they were
convicted or their status as registered sex offenders. 4 However, the
court made clear that this holding only applies to individuals who have
* I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Tim Floyd, for his feedback and
encouragement during the writing process. I am also deeply grateful to my wife, Heather
Ness-Maddox, for her incredible patience with me throughout school and especially the
writing of this Article.
1. 305 Ga. 348 (2019).
2. Id. at 348.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Park, 305 Ga. at 360–61. The court held that O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e) (2019) was
"unconstitutional on its face" because the statute authorized the search of those "no
longer serving any part of their sentences in order to find evidence of possible criminal
conduct." Id.
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served their full sentences—nothing in the majority opinion indicated
that individuals on probation or parole may not be subjected to
long-term (or even lifelong) tracking requirements, and the concurring
opinion specifically endorsed that punishment. 5
The holding in this case is significant for three primary reasons.
First, the court ruled that O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e)6 is unconstitutional to
the extent that it permits tracking individuals who have already served
their sentences.7 Through this holding, the court drew a line in the sand
over which the state cannot step to continue punishing persons who
have finished their official sentences, ensuring that even those
convicted of the most serious offenses are entitled to constitutional
protections. Second, through Park, the state of Georgia joined a
national discussion of Fourth Amendment protections regarding the
long-term GPS tracking of people at various stages of parole, probation,
and freedom. Finally, despite these developments, the majority opinion
implies,8 and the concurrence assures, that the General Assembly is
welcome to make minor changes to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e) to ensure the
constitutionality of what amounts to the same form of punishment
under a different name.9
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2003, a jury convicted Joseph Park of ten counts of sexual
crimes—one count of child molestation and several counts of sexually
exploiting a minor. He was sentenced to serve eight years of a
twelve-year prison sentence and was released from custody in 2011. 10
Following the guidelines in O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14,11 the Sexual Offender

5. Id. at 361 (Blackwell, J., concurring). Justice Blackwell specified that the Park
decision did not preclude the legislature from requiring "GPS monitoring as a condition of
permitting a sexual offender to serve part of a life sentence on probation." Id. The
concurrence's endorsement of additional probation to accommodate long-term GPS
monitoring is especially noteworthy considering Georgia's significant population of
parolees and probationers. As of 2016, Georgia already led the nation in the number of
citizens under "community supervision," Danielle Kaeble, Probation and Parole in the
United States, 2016, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Apr. 2018, at 11 (2016),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus16.pdf, despite being only eighth in overall
population. World Population Review, http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/ (last
visited March 28, 2020).
6. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e) (2019).
7. Park, 305 Ga. at 360.
8. Id. at 353.
9. Id. at 362 (Blackwell, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 348.
11. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(a)(1) (2019).
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Registration Review Board (SORRB) reviewed Park's case and
classified him as a "sexually dangerous predator" under the same
statute.12 Under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e), any convicted person classified
as a sexually dangerous predator was required to wear an "electronic
monitoring system . . . for the remainder of his or her natural life."13
Such persons were also required to "pay the cost of such system" while
on probation, parole, and after fully serving any sentence. 14
After receiving his classification, Park requested that SORRB
reevaluate his case; SORRB complied but upheld his classification. His
failed reevaluation was the first step of several administrative
requirements to attempt to upend his classification. 15 Next, in
compliance with O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(c),16 Park "sought judicial review of
the agency decision," claiming that his classification and the
accompanying tracking monitor requirement violated his due process
rights and constituted ex post facto punishment. 17 The Fulton County
Superior Court upheld his classification, so Park made a discretionary
appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, which denied it. The supreme
court's denial of his appeal left him to live with the superior court's
ruling, and he remained classified as a sexually dangerous predator.18
From that point forward, Park was "required to wear a GPS monitoring
device for the rest of his life."19
Park violated his parole later that year and returned to prison. After
serving this new sentence, he was released from prison in 2015, and he
again registered as a sex offender. In early 2016, police believed that
Park tampered with his ankle monitor, and he was arrested and
indicted for that offense.20
At that point, Park filed a general demurrer and argued that
O.C.G.A.§ 42-1-14, the validity of which was necessary for his
prosecution for tampering with his ankle monitor, was unconstitutional
both in its classification requirements and its requirement that sexually
dangerous predators wear GPS devices after serving their sentences.
The trial court found the statute constitutional and, in 2017, overruled

12. Park, 305 Ga. at 348–49 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(a)(1)).
13. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e)(3) (2019).
14. Id.
15. Park, 305 Ga. at 349.
16. O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(c) (2019).
17. Park, 305 Ga. at 349, see O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(c).
18. Park, 305 Ga. at 349.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 349, see also, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-29(b)(5) (2019), which illegalized tampering
with legally-mandated monitoring devices.
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Park's demurrer. The court did grant his certificate of immediate
review, however, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted his
application for interlocutory appeal to determine the constitutionality of
O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e).21
At that point, Park brought multiple claims against the statute's
constitutionality, but the supreme court only addressed its validity
under the Fourth Amendment, as his claims regarding due process and
ex post facto punishment were barred by res judicata as a result of his
other appeals.22 Based solely on Park's Fourth Amendment claim, the
supreme court determined that O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e) was facially
unconstitutional because its lifelong GPS requirement required a
constant, ongoing, unreasonable searches of people like Park who had
finished their sentences, including probation and parole.23
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment and the Parolee &
Probationer Exception
The Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, and the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution has famously protected individuals
from the State's "unreasonable searches and seizures" 24 since 1961.25
Since then, a litany of cases and theories have developed around that
simple phrase, defining what constitutes an unreasonable search or
seizure.
All statutes are presumed constitutional and, "before an Act of the
legislature can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and
the fundamental law must be clear and palpable." 26 As a result, the law
enforcement action in question must qualify as a "search" to merit
consideration under the Fourth Amendment.27
21. Park, 305 Ga. at 349–50.
22. Id. at 350. Future defendants are likely to ask the court to hold the classification
"sexually dangerous predator" unconstitutional, as Park himself raised constitutional
claims regarding the classification, but the court declined to address that issue due to res
judicata. All the issues barred by res judicata had previously been decided against Park.
Id.
23. Id. at 360.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. The Fourth Amendment always applied to the federal government, but it was not
extended to state governments until the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
26. Park, 305 Ga. at 350 (quoting JIG Real Estate v. Countrywide Home Loans, 289
Ga. 488, 490 (2011)).
27. Park, 305 Ga. at 351.
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In 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Grady v.
North Carolina28 that GPS tracking systems which individuals are
legally required to wear constitute searches of those individuals, no
matter what the government's purpose is in collecting the information. 29
The Court did not hold that such searches are inherently unreasonable,
but that, like other searches, the reasonableness of tracking monitor
searches "depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the
nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which the search
intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations." 30
In 1997, the Court in Chandler v. Miller31 specified that, to be
reasonable, most searches require "individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing"—the suspicion of a particular person for a particular act,
rather than the general idea that someone may have done something
warranting a search.32 Warrantless searches with the intent (or effect)
of pursuing criminal activity without any individual suspicion are, as a
general rule, unreasonable.33 Ten years after Chandler, the Supreme
Court held that the "gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of
questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ
to pursue a given purpose," meaning that law enforcement officers may
not execute suspicionless searches solely on the basis of the seriousness
of the potential criminal activity.34
Some individuals—specifically parolees and probationers—have a
diminished expectation of privacy, and, as a result, are not entitled to
the same individualized treatment as other persons. 35 This principal is
best articulated in the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Samson v.
California,36 in which the Court held that a condition of a parolee or
probationer's release from prison "can so diminish or eliminate a
released prisoner's reasonable expectation of privacy that a
suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not offend the

28. 575 U.S. 306 (2015).
29. Id. at 309–10.
30. Id. at 310.
31. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
32. Id. at 313.
33. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
34. Id. at 42. The idea of individualized suspicion executes a policy of valuing
individuals over the state. This requirement protects individuals at the expense of the
state's ability to control crime, whereas approaches less concerned with privacy—such as
the hypothetical life-long GPS monitoring of parolees—prioritize state needs over
individuals' privacy.
35. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874–75 (1987).
36. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
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Fourth Amendment."37 This holding was not without its critics, though.
Justice Stevens dissented.38 Joined by Justice Souter and Justice
Breyer, Stevens lamented the loss of privacy citizens would face as a
result of the majority's decision. 39 Stevens warned that the majority in
Samson opened the door for "an unprecedented curtailment of liberty"
and that the suspicionless searches sanctioned by the decision were "the
very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to stamp out." 40
The dissenters' forebodings quickly materialized in Jones v. State,41
in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that suspicionless and
warrantless searches of probationers and parolees are acceptable when
the individual subjected to the search has notice that he or she is
subject to warrantless searches as part of a parole arrangement.42
The holding in Samson helped develop the concept of probationers as
quasi-prisoners, with probation being more of an extension of prison
than the halfway point to freedom.43 As the Court articulated in Griffin
v. Wisconsin,44 parolees "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly
dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.'" 45
Following this line of thinking, the Court further held that if there is a
state regulation requiring probationers to submit to warrantless
searches, the searches conducted via that regulation do not need to be
related to the reason for which the individual being searched is on
probation.46

37. Id. at 847.
38. Id. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 857–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also highlighted the consequences of
limiting the expectation of privacy parolees have, arguing that the majority decided "that
parolees have no more legitimate an expectation of privacy in their persons than do
prisoners." Id. at 858. The distance between probationers and prisoners has only become
narrower since Samson was decided, as the facts behind Park illustrate. After Park's
initial appeals and before the alleged tampering with the GPS monitor that led to the
appeal which is the topic of this article, Park returned to prison, not as the result of an
independent crime, but simply as a result of violating his probation. 305 Ga. at 351.
41. 282 Ga. 784 (2007).
42. Id. at 787.
43. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874. The Court noted that "[p]robation is simply one point (or,
more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from
solitary confinement in the maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory
community service." Id.
44. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
45. Id. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
46. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870–71.
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Despite the overall leeway law enforcement officers have in executing
searches on probationers and parolees, the procedure behind the
searches still must be constitutional—in Georgia, the parolees or
probationers being searched remain entitled to prior notice of their
potential subjection to such searches.47 Individuals on probation are not
inherently subject to warrantless searches by virtue of their probationer
status alone, absent notice of potential searches. 48
B. The "Special Needs" Exception
Even in the absence of individual suspicion, a search may be
reasonable in narrow circumstances when "the privacy interests
implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important
governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion . . . ."49 Known as
the "special needs" exception, this category of searches may permit
suspicionless searches when three requirements are present. First, the
special need at hand must be entirely separate from the general
interest of law enforcement.50 Second, the individual privacy issues of
those being searched must be minimal, and finally, the governmental
interest executed by the intrusion of privacy would be jeopardized if
individualized suspicion were required.51
In Griffin, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, under
this scheme, the operation of the probation system itself can qualify as
a special need.52 On appeal below, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
established a rule "that any search of a probationer's home by a
probation officer satisfies the Fourth Amendment as long as the
information possessed by the officer satisfies a federal 'reasonable
grounds' standard."53 The Supreme Court declined to extend the
reasonable grounds standard nationwide but upheld the Wisconsin rule
because the regulation itself satisfied the Fourth Amendment. 54 The
Court specifically noted that probation is itself a punishment, and
because many probationers could just as easily be serving more serious
sentences with even less privacy (such as prison sentences),
47. Jones, 282 Ga. at 787.
48. Id. at 787. ("[The defendant's] status as a probationer, standing alone, cannot
serve as a substitute for a search warrant."). Id. at 788.
49. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
50. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
51. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
52. 483 U.S. at 875.
53. Id. at 872.
54. Id. at 872–73.
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probationers should expect significantly less privacy than other
citizens.55 The Court also considered the practical problems the
government faces in enforcing probation programs, emphasizing that
"[a] warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree with
the probation system . . . ." and that the time taken to obtain a warrant
"would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious
searches would otherwise create."56 This reasoning set a standard of
prioritizing the structure of the criminal punishment system over the
individuals serving in it and supposedly reforming from their criminal
ways under it.57
C. Other Jurisdictions
States have come to different conclusions regarding the same or
similar issues. In 2015, the Michigan Court of Appeals held in People v.
Hallack58 that a statute requiring certain sex offenders to wear location
tracking devices as part of their lifelong sentences was constitutionally
permissible.59 The court heavily relied on Grady and Samson and based
its decision on the seriousness of crimes of a sexual nature, the state
legislature's desire to deter and punish such crimes, and the fact that
probationers and parolees have a reduced expectation of privacy.60 This
is exactly the sort of decision the dissenting justices in Samson
dreaded—the almost complete overhauling of individual rights via the
general suspicion of criminal activity to execute law enforcement
goals.61
The following year, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Balleau v. Wall62 analyzed a Wisconsin statute that
required sex offenders "released from civil commitment . . . [to] wear a
GPS monitoring device [twenty-four] hours a day for the rest of their
lives."63 Unlike the court in Hallack, which acknowledged the privacy
concerns associated with constant GPS monitoring,64 the Seventh

55. Id. at 874.
56. Id. at 876.
57. See id. at 878 ("We think that the probation regime would also be unduly
disrupted by a requirement of probable cause.") and 880 ("[I]t is the very assumption of
the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation . . . .").
58. 310 Mich. App. 555 (2015) (reversed in part on other grounds).
59. Id. at 559.
60. Id. at 580–81.
61. 547 U.S. at 860–61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. 811 F.3d 929 (2016).
63. Id. at 931.
64. Hallack, 310 Mich. App. at 581.
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Circuit took its understanding of convicted persons' diminished
expectation of privacy much further, deciding that the loss of privacy of
persons wearing such monitors was "slight" and "incremental." 65 In
light of that determination and the perceived societal value of such
monitors on convicted sex offenders, the court reversed 66 the district
court's holding that the statute was unconstitutional.67 To the argument
that a search warrant should be required to monitor a person's
movements via GPS, the court said: "That's absurd." 68
Conversely, in 2018, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v.
Griffin69 held that a statute and sentence requiring a defendant to wear
a satellite-based monitoring device for thirty years post-conviction70
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 71 This was because the same
court held in State v. Grady,72 a previous North Carolina case on
remand from the Supreme Court, such monitoring devices needed to
execute the State's asserted goal of decreasing recidivism rates among
sex offenders to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 73 Without proof from
the State "that [satellite-based monitoring] is effective to protect the
public from sex offenders," the court reversed the defendant's sentence
of wearing such a monitor for thirty years. 74 However, the court
appeared unenthusiastic about its decision and emphasized that its

65. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 936.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 931.
68. Id. at 936.
69. 818 S.E.2d 336 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).
70. Id. at 337.
71. Id. at 342.
72. 817 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). The 2018 decision was not North Carolina's
final order in the Grady case; it was heard, modified, and affirmed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in 2019. State v. Grady, 831 S.E.2d 542, 572 (N.C. 2019). The 2019
decision is discussed in part V of this Article. The case originally came before the North
Carolina Supreme Court in 2014. State v. Grady, 367 N.C. 523 (N.C. 2014). That decision
was appealed and subsequently decided by the United States Supreme Court in 2015.
Grady, 575 U.S. 306. It is the same case in which the Supreme Court decided that a GPS
monitor is a search of an individual, and the judgment was vacated and the case
remanded to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina to determine whether the search of
that particular defendant was reasonable. Id. at 311. In 2018, that court of appeals held
that the state failed to prove that the search was reasonable. Grady, 817 S.E.2d at 28.
The next year, the state supreme court affirmed that holding and expanded the court of
appeals' constitutional analysis to apply to all defendants. Grady, 831 S.E.2d at 572.
73. Griffin, 818 S.E.2d at 342.
74. Id.
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prior holding in Grady "compel[led]" the reversal of the defendant's
sentence.75
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
Federal, national, and Georgia legal history left the Georgia Supreme
Court to determine whether individuals who served their full sentences
have the same expectation of privacy as other citizens not on parole,
regardless of administrative classifications. In Park, the court held that
requiring people who are no longer in prison, on probation, or on parole
to wear and pay for GPS monitors on their persons is a facial violation
of the Fourth Amendment, no matter how SORRB classified them. 76
Though parolees may have a diminished expectation of privacy that
would make such searches constitutional for them, 77 the court
emphasized that exception is strictly limited to parolees.78 The parolee
exception has "no application" to non-parolees and non-probationers
and, thus, no application to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e) to the extent that it
requires "[A] lifelong GPS search of individuals, like Park, who have
already served their entire sentences and are no longer on probation or
parole."79 As a result, the statute was unreasonable absent the special
needs exception.80
The court further held that the special need exception to the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to this situation. 81 In applying both parts of
the Knights and Skinner test, the court determined that O.C.G.A.
§ 42-1-14(e) failed the first part of the test because the statute did not
limit the use of the data to any particular type of crime, 82 which
indicated that it was intended for improper general law enforcement
purposes.83 The court emphasized that, even if the statute was enacted
with the laudable goal of decreasing recidivism, that objective was
insufficiently "divorced from the State's general interest in law
enforcement" to satisfy the first part of the test. 84 The statute failed the
second part of the test, which requires that "the privacy interests

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
305 Ga. at 360.
Id. at 354.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 356–57.
Id.
Id. at 356 (quoting Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79).
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implicated by the search are minimal . . . ."85 Because the statute
authorized ongoing searches of individuals who had already served
their sentences in their entirety, the privacy interests were "by no
means minimal" and "the statute [could] not be classified as a
reasonable 'special needs' search."86
Justice Blackwell wrote a concurrence (joined by Justice Boggs,
Justice Bethel, and Judge Padgett) emphasizing an important
implication of the majority opinion: if the Georgia legislature so desires,
it can "put the same policy into practice" through different
administrative and sentencing guidelines.87 The concurring justices
noted that Georgia law already permits sentences of life imprisonment
or imprisonment followed by lifelong probation for those convicted of
certain sexual offenses.88 Following this line of logic, the justices
specified that nothing in the majority decision questioned the
constitutionality of those sentencing guidelines and that, if the
legislature so desires, it may simply expand the requirements for other
convicted persons.89 The concurring justices' solution, then, would put
individuals in Park's position on parole or in prison for life to make the
exact same tracking system constitutionally permissible. 90
V. IMPLICATIONS
A. Park as a Template for Other Jurisdictions
In March of 2019, just twenty-four days after the Park decision was
published, the Massachusetts Supreme Court released its decision in
Commonwealth v. Feliz,91 with a holding similar to that in North
Carolina's Griffin case but for reasons opposite of that case and
Hallack.92 In Feliz, the court acknowledged that probationers have a
85. Park, 305 Ga. at 358 (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314) (emphasis in Park).
86. Park, 305 Ga. at 358. The majority's rigorous application of the Supreme Court's
test highlights a strong interest in protecting individual privacy, even (perhaps especially)
at the expense of crime prevention and control. As there is no dissenting opinion, it
appears safe to say that none of the justices disagree with this application of the test.
However, as discussed below in this Article, Justice Blackwell's concurrence notes the
legislature's ability to amend the statute to comply with the holding without offering
convicted persons any more privacy—and even further limiting their privacy via longer
parole and probation requirements. Id. at 361 (Blackwell, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 361 (Blackwell, J. concurring).
88. Id. at 361.
89. Id. at 362.
90. Id.
91. 119 N.E.3d 700 (Mass. 2019).
92. Id. at 711–12.

[3] NESS-MADDOX CP (DO NOT DELETE)

1258

MERCER LAW REVIEW

5/25/2020 9:40 PM

[Vol. 71

diminished expectation of privacy compared to other citizens but that
the diminished expectation does not extinguish all their Fourth
Amendment rights.93 In light of their remaining rights to privacy,
probationers in Massachusetts, under the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights,94 are still entitled to "individualized determination[s] of
reasonableness."95 This requirement of individualized suspicion
supplants the other potential requirement of probationers being subject
to the "[m]andatory, blanket imposition of GPS monitoring" the statute
in question imposed.96
Most recently, in August of 2019, the North Carolina Supreme Court
published a decision on the earlier Grady case upon which Griffin
relied.97 In that decision, the supreme court finalized the rule that
convicted individuals who are no longer on probation or parole "and who
have not been classified as . . . sexually violent predator[s]" may not be
required to submit to lifetime GPS monitoring. 98 In North Carolina,
then, there is a new rule that strives to honor both Fourth Amendment
rights and administrative classifications intended to protect the public:
individuals who have completed their entire sentences and escaped
long-term negative classification are free from ongoing punishment,
while those catalogued as "predators" have forfeited some of their rights
permanently.99
B. Future Developments in Fourth Amendment Rights for Convicted
Persons
In light of the other cases discussing the same issue, Park falls
somewhere in the middle of the national spectrum of case law on this
topic. The court expressly rejected the reasoning in Balleau because, no
matter the administrative category into which individuals are placed
after serving their sentences, those "who have served the entirety of
their criminal sentences do not have a diminished expectation of
privacy . . . ."100 As a result, the Georgia Supreme Court was
unconvinced that the eventual opportunity to escape GPS monitoring

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
opinion
69.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 711.
ALM CONST. Pt. 1, Art. XIV.
Feliz, 119 N.E.3d at 710.
Id. at 710.
State v. Grady 831 S.E.2d 542 (N.C. 2019). The relationship between this Grady
and the 2015 Supreme Court decision on the same case is discussed supra note
Id. at 568–69.
Id.
Park, 305 Ga. at 360 n.7.
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requirements via reclassification would render reasonable an otherwise
unreasonable search.101
In comparison to Balleau, the holding in Park is fairly individualistic
in that it protects persons no longer serving their sentences rather than
prioritizing the legal system in which they were once involved (as the
Supreme Court endorsed in Griffin).102 However, were O.C.G.A.
§ 42-1-14(e) slightly different and if it more closely resembled the law at
issue in Hallack, it appears likely that the Georgia Supreme Court
would have upheld its validity, especially since Justice Blackwell's
concurrence says almost exactly that.103
Compared to Park, the holdings in North Carolina's recent Griffin
and Grady cases appear to value states' priorities over their citizens as
individuals. This implication exists partially because the holding in
Griffin hinged on a North Carolina-specific interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment that requires evidence to prove that the search in question
effectively serves the State's stated interest in that search. 104 In Grady,
the North Carolina Supreme Court specifically declined to extend full
Fourth Amendment rights to those under administrative classification
similar to Park's.105
Similarly, though the court in Feliz reached the same result and
discussed important federal case law, the turning point in that case was
reached through state law.106 The main difference between that court's
application of the law and the court in Park is the Massachusetts
court's emphasis on the individualized suspicion of wrongdoing which,
though discussed in United States Supreme Court cases, is especially
important in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 107 Without a
similar state article specifically requiring individualized suspicion when
searches involve privacy interests that are not minimal, the court in
Park interpreted federal law similarly and reached the same final
conclusion.108
One major difference between Park and Feliz is the courts' emphasis
on either the individuals experiencing the sentences or the collective
101. Id.
102. 483 U.S. at 875–76.
103. Park, 305 Ga. at 361–62. ("[N]othing in our decision prevents the General
Assembly from requiring a sentencing court in the worst cases to require GPS monitoring
as a condition of permitting a sexual offender to serve part of a life sentence on
probation." (Blackwell, J., concurring)). Id. at 361.
104. Griffin, 818 S.E. at 342.
105. 831 S.E.2d at 567–68.
106. 119 N.E.3d at 710.
107. Id., see ALM CONST. Pt. 1, Art. XIV.
108. 305 Ga. at 360.
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benefits and losses associated with them. These cases indicate the two
directions in which long-term satellite monitoring requirements will
likely develop. Under decisions following the holding in Park, any
long-term GPS monitoring requirement will probably be upheld as
constitutional so long as the person subjected to it is still serving a
sentence of some sort and the monitoring system is a requirement of
that sentence. Other decisions may focus more on the federal (or state)
history of emphasis on individualized suspicion and have holdings
similar to Feliz, choosing to require an inspection of the individual
circumstances to decide whether or not long-term tracking is
appropriate.109
C. The Eighth Amendment: Another Route for Defendants
The majority in Park briefly mentioned a significant issue largely
undiscussed in Park's defense: the massive cost each individual
sentenced under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14 would have to pay over the course
of their lives.110 Because this statute required long-term payment for
the GPS service, it would inevitably raise serious issues for people
simply unable to pay the fee.111 The court speculated that a lack of
payment would lead to an issue with another statutory provision that
no individual may "knowingly and without authority . . . circumvent[]
the operation of an electronic monitoring device" but did not address the
potential for Eighth Amendment112 claims against the statute.113 Were
the General Assembly to pass legislation that, as the concurrence
suggested, "put the same policy into practice," 114 the potential would
remain for defendants to argue that the lifelong fine imposed violates
the Eight Amendment's prohibition against "excessive fines." 115 The
closest the court got to reaching this potential issue was to point out
that the State did not cite any precedent in Georgia "for making citizens
pay for the State to search them."116
D. Freedom, Imprisonment, and the National Conscience
All these cases explore the relationship between those who are free
and those who are not—and the holding in Park underscores that
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

119 N.E.3d at 710.
Park, 305 Ga. at 360 n.8.
O.C.G.A. § 42-1-14(e).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Park, 305 Ga. at 361 n.8 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-7-29(b)).
Id. at 361 (Blackwell, J., concurring).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Id. at 361 n.8.
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difference. We may commonly imagine that the difference between
prison and probation is almost as significant as the difference between
prison and freedom, but this case draws probationers, parolees, and
prisoners closer together, affirming the significant legal divide between
people who have served their sentences and those who have not,
whether or not an individual completes his or her sentence outside a
physical prison.
At the end of the decision in Park, the concurrence gave the
legislature not just a roadmap, but a free taxi to the final destination of
forcing convicted individuals to wear—and pay for—GPS tracking
devices for the rest of their lives post-sentencing.117 Justice Blackwell
went so far as to suggest that the General Assembly may codify life
parole or prison sentences for all individuals deemed sexually
dangerous predators and referred to specific instances in the Official
Code of Georgia where the legislature has passed statutes with similar
provisions and the supreme court has not struck them down. 118
In cases subsequent to Park, primarily Grady and Feliz, state courts
have grappled with the same issue and made decisions putting Park
squarely in the middle of the current national trajectory on punishing
individuals who have already served their sentences. Feliz determined
that individuals convicted of nonviolent sexual offenses in
Massachusetts do not have to worry about lifelong GPS tracking
without individualized evaluations of their situations. 119 At this end of
the spectrum, the difference between the free and those still serving
their sentence is stark, and the Fourth Amendment rights of convicted
persons are protected even if, after thirty years, they have not
completed their full sentences.120
Under Grady, however, only a narrow group of people are guaranteed
to be protected from permanent tracking devices—convicted individuals
are exempt from lifelong satellite-based monitoring only if they were
not convicted of violent sexual acts, convicted of sexual acts with certain
minors, or branded with a certain administrative classification. 121 This
holding smudges the line between those still serving their sentences
and those who have completed theirs while strengthening the bars
around an entirely different category of people: those who have served

117. Id. at 361–62 (Blackwell, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 361 (Blackwell, J., concurring) (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(b)(2) (2019) and
O.C.G.A. § 42-8-35(a)(14) (2019)).
119. 119 N.E.3d at 710.
120. Griffin, 818 S.E.2d at 342.
121. Grady, 831 S.E.2d at 570.
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their sentences but are permanently punished by an administrative
classification.122
Park declines to protect individuals to the extent that Felix does,
while also declining to favor the State to the extent to permit ongoing
punishment under an administrative system after the individual has
served a full sentence.123 However, especially given the content of the
concurrence, the eventual results of the decision in Park may closely
mirror those in Grady.
This result is the blurring of the difference between prison and
probation and is precisely what the dissenters in Samson feared.124 In
that case, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer objected to the
majority's opinion that "conclude[d] that parolees have no more
legitimate an expectation of privacy in their persons than do
prisoners."125 Though the majority in Park emphasized that an
individual's status as a probationer, without any notice of a tracking
requirement, is not sufficient to subject these persons to warrantless
searches at any time,126 the court did not indicate that probationers who
do have notice of a constant search requirement have any more privacy
protections than prisoners. The opinion did not address the Georgia
statutes which provide notice of a lifelong GPS monitoring requirement,
but the concurrence did, specifically noting that such statutes
historically have been perfectly permissible.127 In that way, the majority
in Park did not disavow (and the concurrence readily affirmed) the logic
the Samson dissenting opinion scorned: that "[p]risoners have no
legitimate expectation of privacy; parolees are like prisoners; therefore,
parolees have no legitimate expectation of privacy."128

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
305 Ga. at 360.
See generally 547 U.S. at 857 (Samson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 858 (Samson, J., dissenting).
305 Ga. at 354 (citing Jones, 282 Ga. at 788).
Park, 305 Ga. at 361–62 (Blackwell, J., concurring).
547 U.S. at 861 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

